## CP

### 2ac – key to navy

#### Mexico is key to the navy – copper nickel tubing

General Adams, 13 – Brigadier General for the U.S. Army (Retired) (John, “REMAKING AMERICAN SECURITY: SUPPLY CHAIN VULNERABILITIES & NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS ACROSS THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/RemakingAmericanSecurityMay2013.pdf)

In addition to these domestic companies, the European conglomerate KME and several companies in Mexico also produce Cu-Ni tubing for the U.S. Navy. However, other than Ansonia Brass & Copper, KME is the only company capable of producing this larger diameter tubing according to U.S. military specifications. As a result, the U.S. domestic production capability of Cu-Ni tubing is at risk, potentially leaving the U.S. Navy solely dependent on foreign manufacturers for this important supply chain.

### Japan

#### Carriers are key to prevent Taiwan invasion and save the US-Japan alliance

Loo 09, Board Member at Large of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, Distinguished Fellow of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, one of the founders of Taiwan’s Formosan independence movement, (Jay T., April 3rd, “A storm is gathering in the Strait”, published under the pen-name Li Thian-hok, Taipei Times)

After years of double-digit increases in China’s military budget and intensive efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China now has the capacity to invade and overwhelm Taiwan in the absence of US intervention. But the US is preoccupied with the financial crisis and the intractable wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Pakistan. The US military is stretched thin — especially in East Asia. The Taiwanese government, meanwhile, has been feckless in its national defense efforts for more than a decade. China is now Taiwan’s largest export destination. Most of Taiwan’s high-tech manufacturing has moved to China. The resultant outflow of capital, technology and manpower is hollowing out Taiwan’s economy. Yet the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is determined to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement to turn Taiwan’s economy into an appendage of China’s economy. This would not only erode the standard of living in Taiwan but irreparably damage US-Taiwan relations. James Lilley, former US ambassador to China and Taipei, has observed: “Although the Taiwanese love freedom, they love money more.” So what are the practical implications of the above developments? While the TRA stipulates that the “President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan,” in practice Beijing’s reaction is now one of the main considerations. While the TRA imposes on the US a moral obligation to come to Taiwan’s aid in case of Chinese military aggression, William Murray, a professor at the US Naval War College, wrote in a celebrated paper last fall that if China attacks Taiwan, the US should hold back, observe the war’s progress and take its time in deciding whether to intervene. His reason: The US may risk a strategic failure, in other words, the US may be defeated if it tried to rescue Taiwan. Today there is a gathering crisis in the Taiwan Strait that seems to escape the attention of much of Washington’s policy establishment. A vast majority of the people on Taiwan would reject Chinese communist rule, yet the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government is pursuing a policy of incremental capitulation by reducing the budget and size of Taiwan’s military, deepening the dependency of its economy on China and downgrading Taiwan’s international status. Economic integration measures negotiated by the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT are implemented by the Executive Yuan without public debate or approval by the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan is in danger of being delivered into Beijing’s hands by stealth. While most observers believe there has been an easing of tension in the Taiwan Strait because of the concessions the Ma administration has made to China, China has in fact added another 100 missiles to its arsenal targeting Taiwan since Ma took office. The PLA’s preparations for war against Taiwan have not slackened. Because of declining exports, more than 20 million migrant workers in China have lost their jobs. Ann Marie Slaughter, chief of the US State Department’s policy planning staff, has pointed out that China could launch a military venture against a neighbor (meaning Taiwan) to divert attention from growing social unrest at home. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) wants to visit Taiwan and Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) has said that Wen would be welcome. Such a visit could trigger massive, bloody protests. The resulting chaos could provide the PLA with a pretext to invade Taiwan. Taiwan is facing double jeopardy: an external military threat from China and internal subversion by the Ma government, which is dominated by radical elements in the KMT who are collaborating with Beijing to demolish Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy as expediently as possible. If Taiwan were to fall by PLA coercion or internal subversion, the US would suffer a **geostrategic disaster**. The sea lanes and air space around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China would be in position to pressure Japan and South Korea to become its vassal states. Given Japan’s unstable domestic politics and its aversion to nuclear weapons, chances are Japan would cave once the credibility of the US as keeper of peace in East Asia had been lost. With the demise of the US-Japan military alliance, the US would be forced to retreat all the way back to Hawaii. Using coercion against Taiwan would mean that China had irreversibly forgone the path of development that would lead to a humane, democratic society in favor of keeping its authoritarian model. This would **inevitably bring it into conflict with the US**. The greatest threat to the US’ homeland security is not a terrorist attack with a dirty bomb; it is an unexpected, **nuclear Pearl Harbor.**  The basic US national security strategy is misdirected. In order to keep the peace in East Asia and ultimately to protect homeland security, the US must continue to support democracy and uphold the Taiwanese people’s legitimate aspirations for freedom. To keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait and to encourage China to pursue peaceful development, we urge the US president and Congress to take the following steps: First, reaffirm the US policy that the future of Taiwan must be determined by peaceful means and that the US opposes any unilateral action to change the status quo; Second, deploy at least two aircraft carrier task forces in the Western Pacific and secure basing rights in the Philippines and the Ryukyu Islands as part of US efforts to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion;

#### US-China war causes extinction

**Glaser 11**, **PolSci Prof at Goerge Washington,** (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### The alliance solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war

Armitage 2K - former Deputy Secretary of State, 10-11-2K (Richard, “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership,” INSS Special Report, Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University)

Asia, in the throes of historic change, should carry major weight in the calculus of American political, security, economic, and other interests. Accounting for 53 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the global economy, and nearly $600 billion annually in two-way trade with the United States, Asia is vital to American prosperity. Politically, from Japan and Australia, to the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia, countries across the region are demonstrating the universal appeal of democratic values. China is facing momentous social and economic changes, the consequences of which are not yet clear. Major war in Europe is inconceivable for at least a generation, but the prospects for conflict in Asia are far from remote. The region features some of the world’s largest and most modern armies, nuclear-armed major powers, and several nuclear-capable states. Hostilities that could directly involve the United States in a major conflict could occur at a moment’s notice on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. The Indian subcontinent is a major flashpoint. In each area, war has the potential of nuclear escalation. In addition, lingering turmoil in Indonesia, the world’s fourth-largest nation, threatens stability in Southeast Asia. The United States is tied to the region by a series of bilateral security alliances that remain the region’s de facto security architecture. In this promising but also potentially dangerous setting, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is more important than ever. With the world’s second-largest economy and a well equipped and competent military, and as our democratic ally, Japan remains the keystone of the U.S. involvement in Asia. The U.S.-Japan alliance is central to America’s global security strategy. Japan, too, is experiencing an important transition. Driven in large part by the forces of globalization, Japan is in the midst of its greatest social and economic transformation since the end of World War II. Japanese society, economy, national identity, and international role are undergoing change that is potentially as fundamental as that Japan experienced during the Meiji Restoration. The effects of this transformation are yet to be fully understood. Just as Western countries dramatically underestimated the potential of the modern nation that emerged from the Meiji Restoration, many are ignoring a similar transition the effects of which, while not immediately apparent, could be no less profound. For the United States, the key to sustaining and enhancing the alliance in the 21st century lies in reshaping our bilateral relationship in a way that anticipates the consequences of changes now underway in Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has played a positive role in Asia. As a mature democracy with an educated and active electorate, Japan has demonstrated that changes in government can occur peacefully. Tokyo has helped to foster regional stability and build confidence through its proactive diplomacy and economic involvement throughout the region. Japan’s participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s, its various defense exchanges and security dialogues, and its participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum and the new “Plus Three” grouping are further testimony to Tokyo’s increasing activism. Most significantly, Japan’s alliance with the United States has served as the foundation for regional order. We have considered six key elements of the U.S.-Japan relationship and put forth a bipartisan action agenda aimed at creating an enduring alliance foundation for the 21st century. Post-Cold War Drift As partners in the broad Western alliance, the United States and Japan worked together to win the Cold War and helped to usher in a new era of democracy and economic opportunity in Asia. In the aftermath of our shared victory, however, the course of U.S.-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus and coherence— notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners. Once freed from the strategic constraints of containing the Soviet Union, both Washington and Tokyo ignored the real, practical, and pressing needs of the bilateral alliance. Well intentioned efforts to find substitutes for concrete collaboration and clear goal-setting have produced a diffuse dialogue but no clear definition of a common purpose. Efforts to experiment with new concepts of international security have proceeded fitfully, but without discernable results in redefining and reinvigorating bilateral security ties. This lack of focus and follow-through has been evident in both countries. Some in Japan have been drawn to the notion of “Asianization” and the hope that economic interdependence and multilateral institutions would put the region on a path similar to that of Europe. Many in the United States regarded the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to economic priorities. The early 1990s was a period of heightened bilateral tensions, primarily over the question of access to Japanese markets. Some Americans saw economic competition from Japan as a threat. In the past five years, however, trade tensions have diminished. Envy and concern over Japanese economic prowess have turned to dismay over the Japanese recession and building financial crisis. Neither country dealt with the need to redefine and reinvigorate the alliance. In fact, both took it for granted. The drift in the alliance was obvious until the mid-1990s when the crisis on the Korean peninsula—punctuated by the horror of the Okinawa rape incident— captured the attention of policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. These episodes prompted them to recognize belatedly the costs of neglecting the bilateral relationship. The subsequent Taiwan Strait confrontation in March 1996 gave even more impetus to efforts on both sides of the Pacific to reaffirm the bilateral security alliance. The 1996 U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration went a long way toward directing attention in both capitals toward the need to refurbish the alliance, and led to concrete changes that updated defense ties in the form of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the bilateral agreement to cooperate in theater missile defense research. But the symbolism of the 1996 declaration stood alone, unsupported by sustained high-level attention. As a result, the United States and Japan soon returned to bickering and poor policy coordination. The costs of the deterioration in the U.S.- Japan relationship have been insidious as well as obvious. By the end of the 1990s, many U.S. policymakers had lost interest in a Japan that appeared incapable of renewing itself. Indeed, Japan’s prolonged recession has discouraged or dispirited even some Japanese officials. In Tokyo, many see Washington as arrogant and unable to recognize that its prescriptions are not universally applicable to others’ economic, political, and social needs. A number of government officials and opinion-makers perceived the U.S. approach as a self-serving rationale for commercial and economic interests and grew resentful of a United States seemingly preoccupied with its own self-centered version of globalization. It has been obvious that U.S. attention and interests have turned elsewhere in Asia. More recently, the principal focus of American policymakers has been the bilateral relationship with China—a relationship characterized by a series of crises ever since the 1989 Tiananmen Square pro-democracy demonstrations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo followed through aggressively on the security agenda set forth in the 1996 declaration, in large measure because of concerns over Beijing’s hostile reaction to the reinvigoration of the security partnership. Beijing let it be known in no uncertain terms that it regarded the U.S.-Japan partnership as an important element of a broader effort by Washington to constrain its regional diplomacy. And as the United States and—to a lesser extent—Japan sought to improve relations with China, both demonstrated a clear desire to downplay the notion of a containment strategy. In fact, the only active security dialogue between the United States and Japan has been a byproduct of a desire to coax North Korea out of its self-imposed isolation. The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea all concur that close cooperation and unity of purpose offer the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang. This record of diffidence, uncertainty, and indirection has no single father, nor does it support an oversimplified laying of blame. Rather, it demands a recognition that the time has arrived for renewed attention to improving, reinvigorating, and refocusing the U.S.- Japan alliance. Both the United States and Japan face an uncertain security environment in Asia at a time of political transition and important change in both countries—for the United States, a new national leadership, and for Japan, a continuing process of economic, political, and social transformation. At the same time, political and economic uncertainties in China and Russia, the fragile nature of detente on the Korean peninsula, and the prospect of protracted instability in Indonesia— all pose shared challenges. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that it has been only a decade since it was taken as an article of faith that American power was ebbing on the international scene. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the enduring dimensions of Japanese power, much as it was unwise for some Japanese to dismiss the latent and enduring qualities of American power in the 1980s and 1990s. Politics Over the past decade, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), faced with internal divisions, a clash of traditional interest group agendas, and a growing split among key constituencies, has focused primarily on hanging on to its dwindling power. At the same time, the political opposition has failed to produce credible, well-conceived policy proposals. The net effect is an LDP struggling to maintain its grip on the reins of government, an opposition unable to provide a governing alternative, and a Japanese public, faced with a lack of credible alternative leadership, reluctantly returning the LDP to office. The result has been a govern government stuck in neutral, incapable of more than muddling through. Nevertheless, the necessity of economic reform and restructuring, driven by the pressures of a relentless globalization of the international economy, are likely to lead to political change. These economic forces are breaking apart the monopoly power of the so-called Iron Triangle—the heretofore collusive relationships among politicians, business, and the bureaucracies—and making power more diffuse. The Japanese political order is experiencing protracted change. Political changes in Japan could lead to unprecedented opportunities to reinvigorate the U.S.-Japan relationship—as well as test it further. The end of bipolar ideological confrontation in Japanese politics and the emergence of a new pragmatism about security affairs among a younger generation of elected officials provide fertile soil for creative new approaches to leadership. It would be unrealistic to expect the current leadership suddenly to embrace reform or to assume a higher profile on the global stage. The demands of Japan’s parliamentary system make it difficult to implement policies, that require short-term pain in exchange for longterm gain. The political system is risk-averse. But the successor generations of politicians and the public-at-large also recognize that economic power alone will no longer be enough to secure Japan’s future. Moreover, the Japanese public, by giving official standing to the national flag and anthem, and in focusing on such territorial claims as the Senkaku islands, has evidenced a new respect for the sovereignty and integrity of the nation state. The implications for the U.S.-Japan relationship stemming from these changes are profound. A similar process is at work in the United States. The growing role of Congress as a force in foreign policy, the rising influence of state and local governments, and the dramatic transformation of the private sector as the initiator of economic change—driven by technology and the empowerment of the individual— are altering the influence of once-central foreign policymaking institutions. But, just as Japan’s risk-averse political leadership has held back the nation’s economic transformation, the lack of clear direction from Washington also has taken a toll. Episodic executive branch leadership has failed to produce a well-conceived game plan for America’s relationship with Japan. This, in turn, has accelerated the erosion of political support and popular understanding of the importance of the alliance. In short, the political, economic, and social changes underway in the United States put an even greater premium on executive branch leadership in foreign affairs. If the United States can exercise leadership— that is to say, excellence without arrogance— in its relations with Japan, the two countries will be better able to realize the full potential for cooperation nurtured during the past 50 years. If the changes underway in Japan ultimately produce a stronger, more responsive political and economic system, the synergy in U.S.-Japan relations will enhance our abilities to play an engaged, mutually supportive, and fundamentally constructive role in regional and global arenas in the years to come Security Because the stakes are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered dramatically by a visible and “real” U.S.-Japan defense relationship. The use of bases granted by Japan allows the U.S. to affect the security environment from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf. The revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the basis for joint defense planning, should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling—for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance, and the uncertainties of the post-Cold War regional setting require a more dynamic approach to bilateral defense planning. Japan’s prohibition against collective self defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner. We see the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain as a model for the alliance. This arrangement requires the following elements: Reaffirming the defense commitment. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the defense of Japan and those areas under the administrative control of Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. Diligent implementation of the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, including passage of crisis management legislation. Robust cooperation of all three U.S. armed services with their Japanese counterparts. The U.S. and Japan should strive for greater jointness in the use of facilities and for integration of training activities and should review and update the roles and missions of the Armed Forces agreed upon in 1981. Both partners should invest in training that replicates reality, rather than follows old patterns. They also should define how to assist each other with emerging new challenges, such as international terrorism and transnational criminal activity, as well as longstanding potential threats, and how to collaborate in peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. Full participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions. Japan would need to remove its 1992 self-imposed restraints on these activities so as not to burden other peacekeeping nations. Development of a force structure that has the characteristics of versatility, mobility, flexibility, diversity, and survivability. Any adjustments should not be based on an artificial number, but should reflect the regional security environment. As this process unfolds, changes to force structure should be made through a process of consultation and dialogue, and be mutually agreeable. The United States should take advantage of technological changes and regional developments to restructure its force presence on the archipelago. We should strive to reduce the American military footprint in Japan as long as our capabilities can be maintained. This includes continued consolidation of U.S. bases and rapid implementation of the terms of the 1996 U.S.-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement. Making priority availability of U.S. defense technology to Japan. Defense technology must be seen as an essential component of the overall alliance. We should encourage the American defense industry to make strategic alliances with Japanese companies to facilitate a greater two-way flow of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. Broadening the scope of U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation. There will be a healthy debate in both countries arising from the larger role that we advocate for Japan. And U.S. Government officials and lawmakers will have to recognize that Japanese policy will not be identical to American policy in every instance. It is time for burden sharing to evolve into power-sharing and this means that the next administration will have to devote the considerable time that will be necessary to bring this into being. Okinawa A large concentration of U.S. forces in Japan—approximately 75 percent— are stationed on Okinawa. They are situated there because in matters of security, distance matters. Okinawa is positioned at the intersection of the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean—only about one hour’s flying time from Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The U.S. Air Force base at Kadena provides a critical link to American power projection throughout the region. It is also crucial to the defense of Japan. The III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa provides a self-sustaining, joint forward echelon for rapid response to problems in the region, ranging from evacuation of noncombatant personnel to serving as cutting edge combat elements to enable large formations to defeat aggression. But the heavy concentration of U.S. forces on Okinawa also creates an obvious burden for Japan and a less obvious one for the United States, arising, for example, from restrictions, such as those on training. Because of their intense operational tempo and younger demographic profile, the Marines have drawn particular scrutiny from a Japanese public ready for some changes in the U.S. military presence in the southernmost prefecture of the country. For their part, the Marines have striven to be better neighbors, but readiness and training have suffered with the growing constraints imposed on them by encroachment around the bases. And while statistics on incidents of misconduct by American service personnel are sharply down, in the current political climate, attention to episodes of deeply unfortunate behavior that do occur is sharply magnified. In 1996, the U.S.–Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement called for a realignment, consolidation, and reduction of U.S. bases on Okinawa. The United States and Japan must complete implementation of that accord, which will reduce U.S. assets by about 5,000 hectares and 11 facilities, including the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. We believe the SACO agreement should have had an important fourth goal— diversification throughout the Asia-Pacific region. From a military perspective, it is important for U.S. forces to have broad and flexible access across the region. But from a political perspective, it is essential to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans so that our presence is sustainable and credible. American thinking about force structure in Japan must not stop with the SACO accord. The United States should consider broader and more flexible deployment and training options for the Marines throughout the region.

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### 2ac – framework

Framework – Our interpretation is that the neg gets the status quo or competitive policy option – that’s key to fairness- infinite assumptions in the 1AC– we should get the aff as offense – also key to plan focus which is necessary for in depth debates

#### The Role of the Ballot is Policy Simulation

Hodson 10 Derek, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in **developing the skills**, attitudes, and values **that will enable them to** take control of their lives, **cooperate with others to bring about change**, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest. FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the **knowledge** that is **likely to promote sociopolitical action** and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) **scientific and technological knowledge** that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the **desirability of those outcomes.** Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. **It is essential** that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and **political system(s)** that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how **decisions** are **made within** local, regional, and **national government** and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the **mechanisms by which decisions are reached**, **intervention is not possible.** Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (s

ee Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which **sociopolitical action depends** is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the **establishment of policy**.

#### Debating about policy towards Latin America is valuable – without it change is impossible and their discourse gets coopted

Ried Ijed ’10- Ried Ijed is the Revista interamericana de Educación para la Democracia Interamerican Journal of Education for Democracy, (“Towards a Deliberative and Democratic Model of International Cooperation in Education in Latin America”, Vol 3 No. 2, December 2010)

While the discourse of international organizations has changed over the past decade to emphasize more local participation, there continues to be a disjuncture between “explicit” statements embodying democratic values and ideals, and the actual practices within these organizations (Samoff, 2004). There are potentially several factors (both political and technical) that lead to disjuncture between policy and practice. Among the most commonly cited of political factors is the tendency for international organizations to co-opt discourses about participation in order to gain legitimacy, but without showing any real commitment to a democratic transformation and the devolution of power, authority, and control (see Klees, 2002). Democratization policies in these contexts are merely “symbolic,” in that at a public level the problem is recognized but at the implementation level they are neither supported with adequate resources nor sufficiently specific enough to be operationalized (Stromquist, 2003). Technical factors may include the inherent limitations on representation in democratic processes, or the lack of financial resources, technical know- how, and skills required to implement changes and mechanisms that would allow for more democratic participation.

### 2ac – heg good

#### Things are getting better now because of hegemony—intensity and number of wars are at the lowest in history

Drezner 5—Professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel, “Gregg Easterbrook, war, and the dangers of extrapolation”, Blog @ Danieldrezner.com, 5/25, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html>

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot ofthem. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

### 2AC

#### Mexico can produce drones – open licensing is necessary to overall production

Godoy 5/11/13 – Mexico-based correspondent who covers the environment, human rights and sustainable development, journalist since 1996 and has written for various media outlets in Mexico, Central America and Spain (Emilio, “Mexicans Develop Drones for Peace”, Tierramerica, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/mexicans-develop-drones-for-peace/)

MEXICO CITY, Apr 11 2013 (IPS) - Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), better known as drones, have earned a bad reputation due to their controversial use by the United States in its “war on terrorism”, yet they have almost unlimited potential as tools for scientific research. The word “drone” is most commonly associated with the remotely piloted and heavily armed aircraft that are used by the United States to strike down suspected terrorists, but have also caused a great many civilian deaths in countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. However, more than 40 countries around the world either deploy or manufacture drones, according to reports consulted for an article published by IPS. These unmanned airplanes and helicopters are used for such diverse purposes as drawing maps, exploring the ocean floor, measuring temperature or pollution levels, monitoring weather phenomena, and the surveillance of high-risk areas or archaeological sites. Last month, the U.S. space agency NASA sent drones into the plume of the Turrialba volcano in Costa Rica to study its chemical composition. “The technology is emerging, the first applications have just barely begun. Society itself has learned to accept drones beyond their military uses, because they have seen the different ways they can be used. It’s just a matter of time” until they become more widely developed and used, said young Mexican entrepreneur Jordi Muñoz, co-founder of 3D Robotics, a pioneer in the manufacture of drones in Mexico. His story mirrors the evolution of drones, which he began to build in 2007 with the help of 500 dollars provided by U.S. physicist Chris Anderson. “He gave me the money purely on trust. It was the best 500 dollars I ever invested. I decided to build a drone. I was developing the automatic pilot and I went on Google to look for information when I came across a forum. I went in, registered, and saw that they were posting things about homemade drones,” recalled Muñoz, who is currently finishing a degree in computer engineering at the University of California, Berkeley in the United States. The forum was DIY (“Do It Yourself”) Drones, an online community created by Anderson in 2007 as a space for hobbyists who build their own UAVs to share experiences, electronic codes and component maps. “I started to post videos, write code, and document and publish what I was doing,” Muñoz told Tierramérica\*. His work caught the attention of Anderson, the editor-in-chief of Wired magazine until this past January and now the young Mexican’s partner in 3D Robotics. The company does not sell UAVs for military use. The vehicles are designed in the southwest U.S. city of San Diego and assembled across the border in Tijuana, Mexico. They receive between 100 and 150 orders daily from clients in the United States, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Israel and Japan. 3D Robotics currently employs 60 people and hopes to expand its staff to 100 by the end of the year. Since its founding in 2009, the company has earned around 10 million dollars through sales and received another five million from three U.S. funds that provide financing for tech firms. “In 2013 we want to professionalise all of our products. There have been huge advances, everything has now been greatly simplified, and we want to make drones easy to use. But we need engineers to write code, for manufacturing,” said Muñoz. Working on the basis of open licensing, a network of engineers around the world work together to improve codes and develop more advanced products.

#### Drones Are Key to Decapitating AQAP – Criticisms That Highlight Blowback Wrongly Link Drone Strikes to Recruitment and Overstate the Negative Consequences – Only Increasing the Effectiveness of Drone Strikes Can Drain AQAPs Legitimacy and Create Space for Alternative Engagement Strategies

By Stacey Emker second year Master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations January 14, 2013 Analyzing the US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2013/01/analyzing-the-us-counterterrorism-strategy-in-yemen/

When direct action is taken, drone strikes are conducted in concert with the Yemeni government to avoid civilian casualty. President Hadi publicly endorsed U.S. drone strikes in September 2012, making Yemen a reliable counterterrorism partner. This factor is crucial when assessing the effectiveness of drones in Yemen under former President Saleh compared to President Hadi. While former President Saleh pledged Yemen’s support to the U.S. in the “war on terror,” U.S. officials and Yemeni experts questioned Saleh’s commitment and saw him as an unreliable partner and source of intelligence. John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, has made frequent public visits to Yemen over the past year. When speaking of President Hadi’s counterterrorism efforts, Brennan has stated that “the cooperation has been more consistent, more reliable and with a more committed and determined focus.” With this, the information provided by the Yemeni government under President Hadi has greatly improved the efficacy of the drone campaign, and helped in avoiding catastrophic mistakes.¶ The conventional understanding of drones and collateral damage is not a sufficient or systematic explanation of recruitment within the domestic context of Yemen. Christopher Swifts’ interviews with tribal leaders, Islamic Politicians, Salafist clerics, and other sources all revealed that AQAP recruitment is not motivated solely by U.S. drone strikes, but driven by economic desperation. AQAP insurgents lure young Yemeni men with the promise of a rifle, a car, and a salary of four-hundred dollars a month, which is a fortune when half the population is living on less than two dollars a day. AQAP has employed a soft power approach by fulfilling social needs in order to build networks of mutual dependency.¶ Despite the general antipathy for drone strikes, a majority of the Yemeni’s interviewed expressed that AQAP posed a serious threat to their country and had a pragmatic view of the U.S. drone campaign. As long as drones target legitimate terrorists, Yemenis grudgingly acknowledge their utility. With this, it is important to note Yemen’s religious majority and nationalism. The population of Yemen is almost entirely Muslim, made up of Zaydis and Shaf’is. Zaydis are found mostly in North and Northwest Yemen and belong to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Zaydis form the the Huthi insurgent movement, and AQAP statements in Inspire have connected the movement to threats posed by Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Since AQAP has attacked two Huthi processions in 2010 and threatened supporters, Zaydi Yemenis do not represent practical recruitment options for AQAP. On the hand, the majority of Yemenis are Shafi’is making up the South and East. The Shafi’is school follows one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and is considered a relatively moderate form of Islam. While Islamic radicalism is prevalent within the country, Shafi’is is culturally very different and is not exactly fertile breeding grounds for extremist ideology. As a result, the Al-Qaeda ideology does not go hand-in-hand with the majority of the Yemeni people.¶ Analysis of AQAP’s history suggests that the group’s resiliency within Yemen is due to a group of local Yemeni leaders who understand the local language, tribal customs, and developed relationships with prominent sheiks. Unlike predecessor jihadist groups in Yemen, AQAP has exercised strategic discipline in creating coherent, but nuanced propaganda. The group assimilates broadly popular grievances into a single narrative proposing international jihad as the only solution. The group exploits common malcontent with the Yemeni government over injustices including corruption, the absence of public services and political reform, and unequal distribution of profits from oil. In addition, AQAP has not explicitly called for the outright dissolution of tribal identity like AQAM in Afghanistan Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan. Within Yemen, AQAP targets Western interests, Yemeni security officials, and economic sectors such as oil and tourism. The group has specifically avoided Yemeni civilian casualties in bombings and suicide attacks. Also, AQAP has avoided potentially divisive American and European targets, such as the many Western-language students, foreign aid, and medical workers who remained in Yemen until 2010. With this, AQAP leaders recognized the importance of managing perceptions in order to sustain legitimacy and have even denied responsibility for terrorist attacks that did not fit with its narrative. The most direct way to reduce AQAP’s viability in Yemen, while simultaneously limiting its capacity to attack the US, requires the removal of its local leadership through drone strikes who are responsible for the group’s strategic guidance.¶ With this, it important to note that drone strikes represent only one tool in the U.S.’s comprehensive policy towards Yemen. The costs of U.S. drone strikes correspond with three distinct forms of blowback that have helped to strengthen AQAP’s narrative and increased recruitment and sympathy for Al-Qaeda linked militants. However, the costs do not outweigh the utility of drone strikes against AQAP within the domestic context. While the U.S. acted more unilaterally in Yemen under President Saleh, the Obama Administration is now working in concert with the transitional government of President Hadi. With this, the relationship between the U.S. and Yemen has transformed into a working partnership in the fight against AQAP. As a partnership, this counterterrorism policy is beneficial for both Yemeni and international support.¶ While Yemen is facing a number of issues, debilitating AQAP represents the first step in improving the overall security situation. By targeting AQAP’s local leadership, the U.S. can eliminate the individuals who are most responsible for maintaining the group’s coherency and strategic guidance. Furthermore, it can be presumed that the AQAP members next in line will be less skilled and will be more prone to violence in order to consolidate power. The leadership will make more mistakes, such as targeting Yemeni civilians, and undermine the group’s legitimacy within Yemen.

#### AQAP on the rise – attack coming and the commitment is huge

CNN Security 2-16-12 (“Al-Qaeda’s Biggest Threat,” http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/16/al-qaedas-biggest-threat/, Mike)

Ibrahim al-Asiri is the sort of terrorist who keeps intelligence officials awake at night. He’s al Qaeda’s chief bomb-maker, and he built explosive devices hidden in printer cartridges that got onto several planes in October 2010. He’s still at large in Yemen. The bomb plots he’s alleged to have masterminded – the 2009 underwear bomb plot and printer bombs dispatched to the United States in 2010 – have very nearly worked. And security experts say al-Asiri and al Qaeda in Yemen may yet penetrate the security screening that is meant to protect aviation. Three international plots In the summer of 2009, two Saudi brothers clasped each other in a last embrace in the desert. The elder brother, Ibrahim al-Asiri, had constructed a bomb like none al Qaeda had produced before: a device designed to be inserted inside the rectum of a suicide bomber containing around 100 grams of PETN, a difficult-to-detect white powdery explosive. The suicide bomber was his younger brother, Abdullah al-Asiri. And their target was Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the head of Saudi counter-terrorism, whose security services had driven them out of Saudi Arabia two years earlier. Their group - al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) - was determined to show that even well-protected targets outside Yemen were not beyond their reach. In the end, the attack - in August 2009 - failed. Despite gaining entry to bin Nayef’s residence by claiming to be defecting, the device killed only Abdullah al-Asiri and slightly injured the head of Saudi counter-terrorism. But even in failure, his brother and comrades were emboldened. Never had al Qaeda come so close to killing a member of the Saudi royal family. At about the same time, a young Nigerian - Umar Farouk AbdulMutallab - arrived in Yemen. Schooled in the West and from a prominent family, he had become radicalized as a student in London. He was the ideal candidate to carry out AQAP's most ambitious attack yet. According to recently released court documents, al-Asiri was instrumental in developing plans for the Nigerian to bring down a U.S. passenger jet as it approached its destination. According to the documents, al-Asiri worked in tandem with American-Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who persuaded the Nigerian to conduct a martyrdom mission and approved al-Asiri’s plan for getting a bomb past security onto a U.S.-bound airliner. Al-Asiri met with AbdulMutallab several times and personally delivered his ingenious new device: 200 grams of PETN stuffed into the lining of specially tailored underwear. According to the court documents, al-Asiri trained AbdulMutallab, "having the defendant practice the manner in which the bomb would be detonated, that is, by pushing the plunger of a syringe, causing two chemicals to mix, and initiating a fire (which would then detonate the explosive)." AbdulMutallab slipped through airport security to board a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas Day but failed to fully detonate the device as the plane came in for landing. It was a lucky escape. An explosives expert told CNN that one of the likeliest explanations for the failure was the wear and tear on the device during AbdulMutallab's three-week journey through Africa, before flying to the United States. After the failed attack, the FBI found al-Asiri’s fingerprints on the underwear device and matched them to a file kept by the Saudi government, but the bomb-maker continued to elude the grasp of counter-terrorism agencies. The following year, Ibrahim al-Asiri began developing his most ingenious device yet. It involved placing 400 grams of PETN inside a printer cartridge and connecting it to a detonator and timer embedded in the circuitry of a laser printer. The choice of a laser printer was deliberate: PETN is similar in texture to ink-toner powder and would therefore evade detection by single-view X-ray machines at many air cargo departure points. "Whoever designed this is at the clever end of the scale," Sidney Alford, one of the world’s leading explosive experts, told CNN. Al-Awlaki again played a significant role in the plot. He “certainly encouraged, supported, supervised al-Asiri's efforts," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. In late October 2010, two printer bombs designed by al-Asiri were dropped off at FedEx and UPS offices in Sanaa, Yemen. They passed through airport security undetected and were then loaded onto the first leg of their journey toward the United States. Only an intelligence tip to Saudi authorities allowed authorities in Dubai and the UK to eventually intercept the deadly cargo. Al-Asiri had concealed the explosives so well that bomb disposal teams at both locations initially believed the printers were not bombs. It was the most sophisticated al Qaeda device that Western counter-terrorism officials had ever seen, and they said it had the potential to bring down a plane. Al Qaeda later boasted in its online magazine Inspire: "The following phase would be for us to use our connections to mail such packages from countries that are below the radar and to use similar devices on civilian aircrafts in Western countries." A bomb-maker’s journey Though al-Asiri remains a shadowy figure, CNN has pieced together details of his journey to jihad. This account is based in part on a detailed briefing on AQAP that Saudi counter-terrorism officials, including Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, provided late last year to Mustafa Alani, the director of security and defense studies at the Gulf Research Center. Saudi Arabia is generally viewed as having the most extensive intelligence presence in Yemen. Bin Nayef, whose father is crown prince, responded to the assassination attempt against him in 2009 by expanding the Saudi intelligence-gathering operation in Yemen, developing a network of informants, according to Alani. In late October 2010, it was a communication from an informant close to AQAP’s inner circle that tipped Saudi Arabia off to the fact that explosive packages had just been dispatched by the group to the United States, according to Alani. Al-Asiri was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on April 18, 1982. His father had served as an officer in the Saudi military, and according to interviews the family later gave the Saudi newspaper Watan, nothing about Ibrahim and his brother Abdullah’s upbringing marked them for jihad. "They were not religious boys at the time. They used to listen to music and had a wide variety of friends; friends not like the ones they had later when they became more religious," his mother told Watan. One of their sisters told the newspaper that the death of their brother Ali in a car accident in 2000 was a turning point in Ibrahim and Abdullah's attitude. "It was after that that they started swapping videotapes and cassettes on the Mujahedeen in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and they became at times distant," the sister said. "Abdullah started to go out a lot with his new friends to camps known as 'preaching camps.’ " Al-Asiri began studying chemistry at King Saud University in Riyadh but dropped out after only two years, according to Alani. Though he would acquire bomb-making expertise later on, those studies would lay a foundation for his future terrorist career. Then came the Iraq war. Like hundreds of other young Saudis, al-Asiri was determined to fight in Iraq against the U.S. occupation. But he never made it there. In 2006, he was arrested by Saudi security forces as he tried to cross the border into Iraq. "He was not considered an important person, so he was released after spending a brief amount of time in prison," Alani told CNN. He was held for nine months. When he was released, al-Asiri, who became known as Abu Salah in militant circles, attempted to create a new militant cell inside Saudi Arabia, linked to al Qaeda, that planned to bomb oil pipelines in the country, according to his later designation as a terrorist by U.S. and U.N. authorities. When police swooped in on their meeting place in northern Riyadh, six of his cell were killed in a shootout, but he and his brother were not there. They were not then viewed by Saudi authorities as key members of the Saudi wing of al Qaeda, according to Alani. In 2007, al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia instructed its operatives to move to Yemen, according to Alani. Al Qaeda’s Yemen operations had been given a new life after several of its leaders had escaped from prison the previous year. Al-Asiri, then on the run, called his father to tell him he was leaving the country but did not reveal where he was heading. Saudi counter-terrorism were eavesdropping on the call. The brothers crossed the border into Yemen. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that it was only when he moved to Yemen that al-Asiri developed his bomb-making expertise. Alani says there are indications he was tutored by a Pakistani bomb-maker linked to the group. By the summer of 2009, Ibrahim al-Asiri was one of several Saudis in AQAP’s inner circle. In the weeks leading up to the plot to kill bin Nayef, he and his brother were filmed sitting in a tent with several senior AQAP operatives, including its Yemeni leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a former personal secretary to Osama bin Laden. Some counter-terrorism officials believe that al-Wuhayshi might become the overall head of al Qaeda if Ayman al-Zawahiri is killed. The film was for a propaganda video for the forthcoming attack on bin Nayef. According to Alani, the most influential figure within AQAP has been another Yemeni - Qasim al-Raymi - who Saudi counter-terrorism officials suspect steered the group toward directly attacking the United States. After his brother’s death, al-Asiri was deployed to work with a group separate from the rest of AQAP and tasked with plotting attacks against the United States, according to Alani. U.S. officials believe that al-Awlaki led the unit. An enduring threat A U.S. missile strike in September 2011 killed al-Awlaki. U.S. officials believe his death has temporarily lessened the threat of an attack on the United States. But they also believe that AQAP has emerged as the most dangerous part of the al Qaeda terrorist network. As for al-Asiri, "he is in fact undoubtedly one of, if not the largest threats that we face right now," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN. "He's smart, determined and quite secretive about his activities and clearly determined." Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that political turmoil in Yemen is allowing AQAP to gain strength, according to Alani, because the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh has focused its efforts on survival rather than counter-terrorism. Recent months have seen jihadist militants linked to AQAP but operating under the banner Ansar al Shariah periodically take control of towns in southern Yemen. In their public statements, AQAP commanders have claimed to be at the forefront of such efforts - in line with their pledge after the death of bin Laden to follow the guidance of al Qaeda’s new leader, al-Zawahiri, whose strategic maxim for jihadists has long been to create "an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region." Some eyewitness accounts report a new focus within the group on seizing territory. Abdul Razzaq al-Jamal, a Yemeni journalist who was given unique access to al Qaeda fighters in Abyan province, wrote in the Al Quds al Arabi newspaper last autumn that the group had "used a new strategy recently, which is the strategy of showing themselves and controlling." Counter-terrorism analysts disagree on how significant a role the group has played in the fighting in Yemen. An extensive field study published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center in September found that most of AQAP’s fighters - in the low hundreds - were drawn from urban areas, and there was no conclusive evidence that the group had yet won the allegiance of tribes in southern Yemen. By contrast, al-Jamal, the Yemeni journalist, described seeing significantly greater numbers of al Qaeda fighters and witnessing their control of several towns in Abyan province last September. Despite a fluctuating situation on the ground, jihadist militants still control significant territory in southern Yemen, including much of the town of Zinjibar, according to reports. Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe AQAP has taken a back seat in the fighting in Yemen, and has instead taken advantage of the breathing space opened up by jihadist advances to build up its cell structure and a network of safe houses, according to Alani. The group, he says, has learned lessons from Iraq, when seizing territory made al Qaeda an easy target for American airstrikes. "Their objective in Yemen is to secure a safe haven for recruitment, training and for planning attacks," Alani told CNN. He says Saudi counter-terrorism officials believe that AQAP's goal is nothing short of eclipsing al Qaeda "central" in the tribal areas of Pakistan as the dominant node of the terrorist network. "They’ve taken a decision to escalate their global campaign of terrorism," he told CNN. "AQAP believe an attack against the United States is worth a hundred attacks on other places." Intelligence challenges The intelligence tipoff that led to the interception of the explosive printers probably saved lives, but it has also made AQAP even more careful about handling information, making it harder for Saudi counter-terrorism to disrupt future plots, according to Alani. "They tried to find who leaked the information, because the information was so accurate that it must be a human intelligence and not electronic intelligence. Al Qaeda in Yemen became very careful: They hardly use mobile phones, they hardly use any electronic technology." Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism agency believes that al-Asiri has passed on his bomb-making expertise to about five members of the group. "They understand that Asiri is going to be killed or captured one day," Alani told CNN. "We're talking about a new generation of very skillful bomb builders and very committed people." U.S. counter-terrorism agencies have reached a similar conclusion. "There are other people who will benefit from his expertise. I think the fear is not just that he'll share his ability within his own circle, but rather more widely, and send it to other al Qaeda-sympathetic individuals or organizations," a senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN.

#### And even an unsuccessful nuclear attack results in retaliation, which leads to extinction

Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions, InformaWorld)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

### 2ac – alt fails

#### The alt alone fails devolves into endless reflection and navel-gazing—only practical political solutions can solve the epistemology critique (—prefer this evidence, it is from a leader in epistemic criticism)

Gordon 4 (Lewis, Professor of Philosophy at University of Connecticut, Fanon and Development: A Philosophical Look, http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/4-3.pdf) Democracy and Development: Irene Gendzier Although Sylvia Wynter qualified her conclusions by reminding us that we should work through epistemological categories and ‘not merely economic’ ones, her dis- cussion so focuses on the question of conceptual conditions that it is difficult to determine how those economic considerations configure in the analysis. Irene Gendzier, author of one of the early studies of Fanon’s life and thought, took on this task, in addition to elaborating its political dimensions as well, in her 1995 history of the field of development studies, Development against Democracy: Manipulating Political Change in the Third World. Gendzier first points out that development studies emerged in elite, First World universities as an attempt to offer their vision of modernisation over the Marxist ones of the U.S.S.R., Communist China, and Cuba. Their model was resolute: A capitalist economy and elite (oligarchical) democracy. We see here the normative telos writ large: The United States. Although Gendzier does not present this as a theodicean argument, those elements are unmistakable. The initial phase of development studies granted the United States the status of utopia, which means that both its contradictions and those that emerge from its application abroad must be functions of the limitations of the people who manifest them. In effect, Gendzier’s study is an empirical validation of much of Wynter’s and Fanon’s arguments. The record of those development policies is universally bad, although there seems to be no example that could meet any test of falsification that would convince, say, mem- bers of the Council for Foreign Relations, many of whom are from the neoliberal and conservative wings of the North American academic elite. Gendzier uses an apt term to describe the work such policies have done: maldevelopment. Here is her assessment of their record:¶ For many, terms like Development and Modernization have lost their meaning. They have become code words. They refer to policies pursued by governments and international agencies that enrich ruling elites and technocrats, while the masses are told to await the benefits of the ‘trickle down’ effect. For many, Development and Modernization are terms that refer to a politics of reform designed to preserve the status quo while promising to alter it. And for many social scientists, those who have rationalized the interests of governments committed to such policies are accom- plices in deception (Gendzier 1995:2).¶ North American and European development studies set the foundations for U.S. policies that supported antidemocratic regimes for the sake of preserving the eco- nomic hegemony of American business elites, and the supposed dilemma emerged, in many countries under the yoke of First World developmental dictates, of whether to reduce social inequalities, which often led to economic decline on the one hand, or increase economic prosperity, which often led to social inequalities on the other. The problem, of course, is that this is a false dilemma since no nation attempts either pole in a vacuum. How other countries respond to a nation’s social and eco- nomic policy will impact its outcome. It is not, in other words, as though any nation truly functions as a self-supporting island anymore. A good example is the small Caribbean island of Antigua. To ‘normalise’ relations with the United States, that island was forced to create immigration laws that would stimulate the formation of an underclass, which U.S. advisors claimed would create a cheap labour base to stimulate economic investment and an increase in production and prosperity. There is now such a class in Antigua, but there has, in fact, been a decline in prosperity. The reason is obvious: There was not an infrastructure of capital in need of such a labour force in the first place. The island of Antigua has a good education base, which makes the type of labour suitable for its economy to be one of a trained profes- sional class linked in with the tourist economy and other high-leveled service-ori- ented professions such as banking and trade, all of which, save tourism, the United States does not associate within a predominantly black country. The creation of an underclass without an education or social-welfare system to provide training and economic relief, conjoined with an absence of investments from abroad, has cre- ated a politically and economically noxious situation, and the quality of life in Anti- gua now faces decline.8 This story is no doubt a familiar one in nations with very modest prosperity as in Africa.¶ There has been a set of critical responses to development theory, the most influential of which has been those by theorists of dependency.9 The obvious situa- tion of epistemological dependence emerges from the United States as the standard of development, both economic and cultural. The economic consequence is a func- tion of the international institutions that form usury relationships with countries that are structurally in a condition of serfdom, where they depend on loans that it is no longer possible to believe they can even pay back. Fanon would add, however, that we should bear in mind that in the case of many African countries who re- ceived such loans, the situation might have been different had those funds been spent on infrastructural resources instead of as a source of wealth for neocolonial elites. That European and American banks hold accounts for leaders who have, in effect, robbed their countries and have left their citizens in near perpetual debt to the World Bank reveals the gravity of Fanon’s warnings of forty years past. An additional Fanonian warning has also been updated by sociologist Paget Henry, who warns us that the epistemological struggle also includes fighting ‘to save the sciences from extreme commodification and instrumentalisation’ (Henry 2002–2003:51).¶ To these criticisms, Gendzier poses the following consideration. The critics of development have pointed out what is wrong with development studies, particularly its project of modernisation, but their shortcoming is that many of them have not presented alternative conceptions of how to respond to the problems that plague most of Africa and much of the Third World. Think, for example, of Wynter’s call for a new epistemic order. Calling for it is not identical with creating it. This is one of the ironic aspects of the epistemological project. Although it is a necessary reflec- tion, it is an impractical call for a practical response.

### 2ac Perm

**Perm – Do both**

#### Too sweeping to say working-through-State never counters racism – here’s 7 concrete examples:

Seligman 11

Brad Seligman – Lead Counsel, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc – The nationwide class action gender

discrimination case against Wal-Mart Stores and founder of the Impact Fund, which provides financial and technical

assistance and representation for complex public interest litigation – Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy – January–February 2011 – http://www.impactfund.org/downloads/Resources/UsingLawForChange-Seligman.pdf

Litigation as a tool for social change has a long and proud tradition in the United States. In the nineteenth century cases were brought to challenge discriminatory laws such as the Chinese Exclusion Act and to advance labor rights and the rights of women and people of color. In the twentieth century the epic battle to dismantle Jim Crow laws and the “separate but equal” doctrine culminated in the famous Brown v. Board of Education decision. In the 1960s federal rules were developed to make class action litigation more feasible, and courts approved massive institutional-change cases against industries and governmental units.1 In the 1970s environmental litigation, aided by the passage of federal laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act, became common. Starting in the 1980s, however, social justice litigation has become more challenging to pursue due to more conservative judges, tougher class certification and substantive law decisions, more demanding attorney-fee and cost-recovery requirements, the decline in federal enforcement of civil rights and environmental laws, and cutbacks and restrictions on legal services funding.2 Still, such litigation remains a potent weapon for change. In recent years the environmental justice and disability rights movements have shown that the path remains open for innovative litigation. Today we nevertheless must be more strategic and thoughtful about how we use litigation. Here I describe a holistic model of social justice litigation that includes adroit use of the media, coalitions, and working partnerships with community and grassroots organizations and other forms of advocacy. I explore the range of procedural devices in the social justice litigator’s tool box. And I remind readers to take pride in and enjoy their work.

**Perm – Do the Plan and [ ] – have a high threshold for link arguments – they need to win the Plan MAKES things worse –**

**the Plan eliminates and gets rid of bad drone strikes that kill innocent people everyday –**

**we do not endorse or strengthen the state – they need to prove the Plan directly causes worse oppression to win a link**

### Monolithicism Turn

#### Their monolithic view of modernity is bad—it ignores the emancipatory nature it has for new social movements

**Domingues 9** (Jose, Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute, Global Modernization, `Coloniality' and a Critical Sociology for Contemporary Latin America, Theory Culture Society 2009 26: 112, 2009)

The **opening of identities** **and the very emergence of ethnic movement**s,¶ which the state can no longer prevent, **is part and parcel of the third**¶ **phase of modernity**, as much as it is the result of a couple of decades of¶ ethnic militancy. **Formerly a peasant identity** and working-class movements,¶ **along with a leftist** as well as middle-class **nationalism** within the developmental¶ framework, **were the nodal points of identity formation**. This does¶ not mean that ethnic identities were not important: they just tended to be¶ neither rationalized nor politicized as they often (though not always) are¶ today. Social movements, in this regard, are now quite plural and depend¶ on network mechanisms to organize themselves internally as well as to¶ weave alliances (Domingues, 2007: ch. 5, 2008: ch. 3). **Modernity is**, moreover, **a two-pronged phenomenon; this is why we**¶ **must maintain an ambivalent relation** towards it. **It has at its core some**¶ **entrenched systems of dominatio**n: capitalism, the bureaucratic state and¶ patriarchy, as well as racism. While the two former are intrinsic to¶ modernity, **the latter may entertain a more contingent relation to it, regardless**¶ **of how close-knit they have been since its inception**. But modernity also¶ has some key imaginary elements – emancipatory **–** which have furnished¶ **its horizon of expectations across the planet:** freedom, equality and solidarity**,**¶ **with responsibility playing a more discreet though rather important**¶ part (Domingues, 2006). It is quite likely, as Marx argued in his immanent¶ critique, that they cannot be realized in modernity, and therefore need a¶ different type of society in which they would be sublated, including of course¶ ‘coloniality’, a historical feature of the birth and expansion of modernity,¶ however that is conceptualized. It may be also that **perspectives that bring**¶ **into contemporary modern discussions elements from other civilizational**¶ **sources** can provide new elements of criticism – for instance by insisting¶ on the community moment of democracy, such as is the case in Bolivia today.¶ In any case, an **opening of citizenship** **and** to some extent **its transformation**¶ as well as a re-structuration of the nation **stands at the core of** all these¶ movements and their ‘**epistemic’ proposals**. **New principles of thinking and systematic theorizing can be proposed**¶ **by ‘border thinking’ constructions** rooted in indigenous peoples’ movements,¶ reaching maturation in various forms of (hopefully not dichotomous) ‘another¶ thinking’. But other movements and their own brand of ‘border thinking’ –¶ **race-oriented movements, workers’, women’s and environmental movements**¶ or whatever – **stand on an equal footing with ethnically based social movements**,¶ especially in countries in which those are by far the minority. We¶ are far beyond the days when working-class movements could demand an¶ absolutely central position in social change. **It is not reasonable that we**¶ **should expect other partial movements to take their place. This is certainly**¶ **not the Zapatistas’ perspective. Such movements become really threatening**¶ **when they weave broad alliances and when more encompassing issues –**¶ **such as the traditional left banner of nationalization** or the more recent one,¶ taken up again, though transformed and democratically radicalized, of¶ citizenship – **are pursued to their completion**. Such modernizing moves,¶ from which take different directions, will inevitably develop through modernity,¶ albeit not necessarily within it should radical social change come about.¶ While neoliberalism reiterates modern systems of domination (especially¶ capitalism and bureaucratic state power, with low-intensity democracy),¶ those **democratic moves may remain within modernity** (although widening¶ its democratic horizons, at the imaginary level and institutionally) **or point**¶ **beyond it, in any case being informed by and having to engage with it** –¶ even if their constitution as collective subjectivities centrally includes other¶ civilizational elements. **This is** in some part **happening right now, when some**¶ **of those movements take the telos contained in the horizon of expectations**¶ **of modernity** and lend new specificities to older traditions stemming from¶ liberal and socialist thought, creatively transforming them to a large extent,¶ while the same is happening to indigenous traditions, which have by now¶ been radically modernized themselves.

### 2ac – reform turn

#### Claiming “State’s always racist” is a turn. Over-privileges hopelessness – makes actual remedies impossible

Farber ‘98

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And finally, what I fear the most is the response that seemed to be implied by one of the audience questions earlier. If it is true that American society is inherently racist, doesn't that mean that it is essentially hopeless? Now this conclusion does not logically follow from that premise, any more than it logically follows that if certain character traits have a genetic basis then it is hopeless to do anything about them. But nevertheless, we all recognize that when we are talking about individuals and biology, these genetic theories tend to discourage the idea of reform, and tend to reinforce, as a matter of social reality, the view that any bad behavior that we see is just inherent. I think we can expect to see the same kind of thing when we are dealing with the sociological equivalent involving the claim that there is this inherent genetic flaw in American society. You can see this most clearly in Derrick Bell's writings, which are redolent of despair and which, in that respect, curiously resemble Robert Bork's writings, who is similarly convinced that the genetic flaws of American society will prevent it from ever achieving his vision of justice. It is true that we cannot afford to forget our history. It is true that much of that history is unfortunate, if not worse. But it is also true that if we remain totally obsessed with the flaws of the past, fixated on their inevitability, we are unlikely to be able to move past them and move forward. And in particular, it seems to me that if we approach today's problems primarily as an issue in finger-pointing, in blaming somebody or another, or in finding the culprit, then we are not likely to be able to unite our society in a quest toward attacking those serious problems.

### 2ac – globalization good – root cause

#### Globalization resolves the root cause of conflict – interconnectedness and trade benefits provide cohesion between partner countries

Lindsay et. al. 3 (“The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century”, Council on Foreign Relations, Winter 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/globalization-politics-american-foreign-policy-new-century/p6330)

September 11 signaled the end of the age of geopolitics and the advent of a new age— the era of global politics. The challenge U.S. policymakers face today is to recognize that fundamental change in world politics and to use America's unrivaled military, economic, and political power to fashion an international environment conducive to its interests and values. For much of the 20th century, geopolitics drove American foreign policy. Successive presidents sought to prevent any single country from dominating the centers of strategic power in Europe and Asia. To that end the United States fought two world wars and carried on its four-decade-long Cold War with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet empire ended the last serious challenge for territorial dominion over Eurasia. The primary goal of American foreign policy was achieved. During the 1990s, American foreign policy focused on consolidating its success. Together with its European allies, the United States set out to create, for the first time in history, a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. That effort is now all but complete. The European Union— which will encompass most of Europe with the expected accession of 10 new members in 2004— has become the focal point for European policy on a wide range of issues. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has evolved from a collective defense alliance into Europe's main security institution. A new relationship with Russia is being forged. Progress has been slower, though still significant, in Asia. U.S. relations with its two key regional partners, Japan and South Korea, remain the foundation of regional stability. Democracy is taking root in South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan. U.S. engagement with China is slowly tying an economically surging Beijing into the global economy. The success of American policy over the past decade means that no power— not Russia, not Germany, not a united Europe, and not China or Japan— today poses a hegemonic threat to Eurasia. In this new era, American foreign policy will no longer pivot on geography. Instead, it will be defined by the combination of America's unrivaled power in world affairs and the extensive and growing globalization of world politics. The Sole Global Power The United States is today the only truly global power. Its military reach— whether on land, at sea, or in the air— extends to every point on the globe. Its economic prowess fuels world trade and industry. Its political and cultural appeal— what Joseph Nye has called soft power— is so extensive that most international institutions reflect American interests. America's position in the world is unique— no other country in history has ever come close. But is America's exalted position sustainable? Militarily, the vast gap between the United States and everyone else is growing. Whereas defense spending in most other countries is falling, U.S. defense spending is rising rapidly. This year's requested increase in defense spending is greater than the entire Chinese defense budget. Most remarkably, America can afford to spend more. Defense spending takes a smaller share of the U.S. gross domestic product than it did a decade ago— and even the Bush administration's projected increases will produce an overall budget equal to only about 3.5 percent of GDP, about half of Cold War highs. There is little prospect of any country or group of countries devoting the resources necessary to begin competing with the United States militarily, let alone surpassing it. Economically, the United States may not widen its edge over its competitors, but neither is it likely to fall behind. The U.S. economy has proven itself at least as adept as its major competitors in realizing the productivity gains made possible by information technology. Europe and Japan face severe demographic challenges as their populations rapidly age, creating likely labor shortages and severe budgetary pressures. China is modernizing rapidly, and Russia may have turned the corner, but their economies today are comparable in output to those of Italy and Belgium— and they have yet to develop a political infrastructure that can support sustained economic growth. Which brings us to the issue of how to transform this unquestioned power into influence. Unless employed deftly, America's military and economic superiority can breed resentment, even among its friends. A growing perception that Washington cares only about its own interests and is willing to use its muscle to get its way has fueled a worrisome gap between U.S. and European attitudes. European elites increasingly criticize the United States as being morally, socially, and culturally retrograde— especially in its perceived embrace of the death penalty, predatory capitalism, and fast food and mass entertainment. Europe has also begun to exercise diplomatic muscle in international institutions and other arenas, seeking to create new international regimes designed to limit America's recourse to its hard power. The sustainability of American power ultimately depends on the extent to which others believe it is employed not just in U.S. interests but in their interests as well. Following its victory in World War II, the United States led the effort to create not only new security institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO, but also new regimes to promote economic recovery, development, and prosperity, such as the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods monetary system, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs to promote free trade. These institutions and agreements preserved and extended American power— but in a way that benefited all who participated. The challenge for the United States is to do the same today. Globalization Globalization is not just an economic phenomenon, but a political, cultural, military, and environmental one as well. Nor is globalization new; networks of interdependence spanning continents were increasing rapidly in the decades before the First World War as the steam engine and the telegraph reduced the cost of transportation and information. What distinguishes globalization today is the speed and volume of cross-border contacts. The prophets of globalization have trumpeted its benefits, particularly how the increased flow of goods, services, and capital across borders can boost economic activity and enhance prosperity. During the 1990s the more globalized economies grew an average of 5 percent a year, while the less globalized economies contracted by an average of 1 percent a year. The spread of ideas and information across the Internet and other global media has broadened cultural horizons and empowered people around the world to challenge autocratic rulers and advance the cause of human rights and democracy. Globalization can even lessen the chance of war. Fearing that war with Pakistan would disrupt their ties to U.S.-based multinationals, India's powerful electronic sector successfully pressed New Delhi in mid-2002 to deescalate its conflict with Pakistan.

## PTX

**A2: Indian Relations**

#### US-India relations resilient- CIR not enough to spillover

Desai 12 Fellow, Truman National Security Project (Ronak. “US-India Relations under the 2nd obama administration.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronak-d-desai/usindia-relations-under-t\_b\_2115396.html)

 What's ahead for US-India relations now that President Obama has won reelection? With ties between Washington and New Delhi continuing to flourish over the past four years, the US-India bilateral partnership will likely be characterized by continuity and growth during a second Obama term. The fundamental pillars underlying President Obama's foreign policy towards India--strengthening security and military cooperation, boosting trade, and encouraging New Delhi's collaboration on various regional and global issues--will remain largely intact.¶The US-India strategic partnership has thrived during Obama's first administration. Initial concerns from some Indian officials that the newly elected president would "re-hyphenate" relations with New Delhi, prioritize ties with China, insert the US in the Kashmir dispute, and view India exclusively through an Af/Pak lens proved unfounded. On the contrary, President Obama quickly established himself a reliable champion of the bilateral relationship which witnessed Washington and New Delhi expand their engagement in a number of substantive areas.¶ On the security front, cooperation reached unprecedented levels under Obama's first term. The United States now conducts more military exercises with India than with any other country in the world, while counter-terrorism and intelligence collaboration between the two has increased dramatically following the infamous November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. President Obama has also taken significant steps to relax export-controls to India to allow New Delhi greater access to advanced US technology. Additionally, since 2008, the Obama Administration has approved the sale of more than $8 billion in military equipment from US defense suppliers to New Delhi. Administration officials have described India as the "linchpin" of its strategic rebalancing towards Asia and are relying on New Delhi to play a greater role stabilizing Afghanistan once the US begins its military withdrawal there.¶ Economically, trade with India is on track to cross the $100 billion mark for the first time, US investment in the country has skyrocketed compared to just a decade ago, and the two sides have worked to conclude a US-India Bilateral Investment Treaty that would further bolster their economic relationship.¶These positive trends will likely continue during a second Obama administration. Although the basic contours of US-India ties remain unchanged, reflecting the potent durability of the bilateral relationship, this is not to say that the two countries are in perfect harmony with one another on every issue.¶ As President Obama embarks on a second term, Washington will want New Delhi to continue reducing its dependence on Iranian oil, implement significant economic reforms that eliminate barriers to foreign investment, and modify liability legislation enacted by the Indian parliament that has precluded the United States and India from realizing the full benefits of the landmark US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement. President George W. Bush signed the historic accord with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005 and President Obama moved to quickly implement the deal by concluding a reprocessing agreement with India shortly after taking office.¶ New Delhi, for its part, will want Washington to resolve the Iran question exclusively through non-military means, resist entering into any formal security pact with the United States that would appear to compromise its inviolable strategic autonomy, and press Washington to make it easier for Indian tech workers to obtain visas to come to the United States.¶ Yet none of these issues--or any other differences that may remain between the two sides--is capable of arresting the overall upward trajectory of US-India relations. Areas of convergence far exceed areas of disagreement, indicating that earlier misgivings by some observers that bilateral ties had been oversold have been misguided.¶ President Obama has established himself as an able and effective custodian of the US-India strategic partnership. Although the bipartisan consensus that has emerged in Washington around the importance of deepening ties with India would suggest that US engagement with New Delhi would have continued regardless of whether he had won reelection, President Obama is uniquely well positioned to strengthen the US-India relationship during his second-term. His enduring popularity within India, close relationship with Manmohan Singh, and widespread support amongst the Indian-American community are just some of the distinctive factors that will help ensure ties with New Delhi remain robust and continue to grow over the next four years. If the past is any indicator of what's on the horizon, the future looks bright for US-India relations.

#### Relations won’t collapse over Visa policy

**Daily News and Analysis 10** [“U.S. politicians are trying to save their jobs”]

New York’s Democrat senator Charles Schumer calls Infosys a ‘chop shop’. **The US government hikes visa fees for Indian companies which employ more than 50% of H1B** and L1 **visa holders**. President Barack Obama asserts that his policies will ensure American jobs do not any more go to China, India or Germany. **Do these smoke signals add up to a serious crisis point for Indo-US relations? Probably not**. These straws should be seen as nothing more than a political game which has marginal economic significance for the two countries. **Indo-US business relations are nowhere near the brink, and they do not spell doom for either side immediately or in the future.**  It has been customary in India to read a little too much into every American posture in the business arena, but the time has come to treat American politicians in the same way that we do our ours — with amusement, if not disdain. It is not surprising that American politicians make the usual loud and ineffective noises about saving American jobs. They are actually trying to save their own jobs.

#### -- No collapse --- none of their evidence is good enough --- visas are an irritant in relations, but not the key issue --- won’t destroy overall cooperation --- its resilient

**Fernandes 2** (George, Defense Minister – India, “Weighing Inspections”, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 8-28, Lexis)

GEORGE FERNANDES, Defense Minister, India: Well, I don't think they should have had these earlier advisories asking people not to go. There was no situation that warranted that. SIMON MARKS: George Fernandes is India's defense minister. He says he's still optimistic that **the** new **U.S.-Indian relationship will survive any obstacles it encounters**. GEORGE FERNANDES: Our relations with the United States is based on mutual trust and transparency, and naturally, we should be together in fighting all common causes. **There may be areas where there are differences**. On... there could be differences and nuances, there could be differences **in** some ba**sic issues, there could be disputes on trade-related matters**. **There are bound to be hiccups in relationships, but I don't think the** kind of **relationship** that we have today **between the** **U**nited **S**tates **and India** is something that **can be derailed by anyone**. SIMON MARKS: After decades of talking past one another, the world's most powerful democracy is now working closely with the world's largest. **Economic and geopolitical changes have helped lure the U**nited **S**tates **and India closer together. It's a relationship with even more potential for growth** as both sides learn to trust one another.

#### -- India won’t cooperate. U.S. concessions are irrelevant.

**Karl 10** (David J., President – Asia Strategy Initiative, “US-India Relations: It's a Two-Way Street”, Asia Sentinel, 4-30, http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=2434&Itemid=376)

**Criticism of Obama ignores New Delhi's inability to get it together** The **Obama** administration **has drawn** much **criticism for** its perceived **indifference to** America's allies and friends in Asia and Europe. A good deal of this criticism has focused on the specific case of **India**. In the view of quite a number of U.S. observers, President Obama is taking New Delhi for granted, squandering the deep reservoir of diplomatic goodwill that his predecessor so assiduously built up. **Some** have even **sounded the alarm that Obama is "losing India,"** while others caution that the negligent treatment is pushing New Delhi closer to Moscow and Beijing. **But part** of the reason for Washington's languid engagement with New Delhi **has to do with** nagging **doubts that India can deliver on dramatic initiatives**, **and there is good reason for this doubt** In India, elites had grown accustomed to the pride of place the country enjoyed just so recently in Washington's strategic calculus. Obama's honeymoon with India was virtually non-existent. Even before he took office, one could hear rumblings of unease about his commitment to the civilian nuclear agreement, his stance on corporate out-sourcing, or his willingness to re-hyphenate India and Pakistan in U.S. policy calculations. As Obama was being inaugurated, then-Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon (and current national security advisor to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh) was even reported as having publicly expressed his apprehensions about the new administration. Things have not improved since. The Indian commentariat took umbrage when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton decided not to include India in her inaugural tour of Asia in February 2009. (This despite the fact New Delhi's leaders were about to plunge into parliamentary elections and it is unclear whether her visit would have served any substantive purpose.) By May 2009, one analyst concluded that "there [is] no mistaking the thrill in gone" in bilateral relations. More recently, others have exclaimed that **mistrust of** President **Obama "pervades the Indian establishment"** or have warned of foreboding "storms ahead in the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership." Observing that **Indian memories are long and snubs never forgotten**, a leading journalist warns of rising public resentment against the United States. As far as it goes, much in the critique about the Obama approach rings true. To date, the administration has been long on rhetoric about bilateral affairs but short on concrete deliverables. There is no question that the President is sincere about cultivating Indian friendship. At last November's summit meeting with Prime Minister Singh, the White House, for example, pulled out all the stops in hosting an elegant state dinner in Mr. Singh's honor. But the summit is remembered more for the antics of its party-crashers than for any substantive outcome. To be sure, President Obama has entrusted management of the India portfolio to two senior Cabinet members with special bonds to the country: Secretary Clinton, who is a staunch India-phile and speaks often of taking relations to a higher plane, and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, who spent five years of his childhood in India. But it remains to be seen whether Clinton has the heft inside the administration and Geithner enough room on his crowded agenda to move headline-grabbing initiatives forward. The meager outcome of Geithner's trip to India last month only underscores this concern. All in all, it is a fair judgment that the Obama administration has not yet displayed much interest in continuing its predecessor's high-profile engagement with New Delhi. Even the just-concluded agreement on nuclear fuel reprocessing is more about tending to unfinished business than striking out in creative new directions. While much of **the critique** against Obama is valid, it also **misses the other side of the equation**. **New Delhi**, too, **bears part of the blame for the inertia in bilateral affairs**. **One cannot have a** private **discussion** these days with US officials responsible for India policy **without detecting nagging doubts about New Delhi's eagerness to take on bold bilateral projects**. Indeed, it seems that **the unexpectedly arduous debate** in New Delhi two years ago **about the** civilian **nuclear accord**, intended to be a cornerstone of the new era of relations, has **had the** ironic **effect of sapping the readiness of officials** in both capitals **to invest political capital in** ambitious **bilateral undertakings**. As the Washington Post noted during the debate, "if New Delhi's politicians cannot find a way to say yes to such a clearly advantageous agreement with a natural ally, the next US administration no doubt will think twice before trying anything like it." Of course, Prime Minister Singh finally did manage to push the nuclear accord through the Indian parliament, but only after a long and bruising debate that revealed the depth of opposition to greater interaction with the United States. It was especially disconcerting that the debate devolved into an unprecedented parliamentary vote of confidence on a foreign policy issue. Singh's narrowly-won victory was possible only through resort to extraordinary maneuvers, including the temporary furloughing from jail of members of parliament who had been convicted of crimes. The entire episode was hardly one to inspire confidence in New Delhi's capacity to deliver on galvanizing initiatives. That **India played** such **a prominent role in the collapse of** the **Doha** Round world trade talks, just as debate over the nuclear accord heated up only added to this perception. **More recent events** have **reinforced** **this impression**. Despite the large parliamentary support **Singh** currently enjoys, he **has yet to initiate** the **domestic** **reforms that would allow** for closer economic **engagement with the** **U**nited **S**tates. **In the face of fierce opposition** last month, **his government had to backtrack from** submitting **key legislation that would enable** the **involvement of** **US companies in India's** nuclear **energy sector** – one of the very things that the nuclear cooperation accord was suppose to bring about. Despite Singh's renewed determination to promote needed involvement in India by foreign educational institutions, similar legislation has come to naught in the past due to parliamentary concerns about protecting the country's cultural sovereignty. **His government has** also **gone slow on** two **agreements** designed **to** **strengthen military links with the** **U**nited **S**tates. Even granting the complex, cacophonous nature of Indian democracy, **New Delhi still seems to lack the political will necessary for a dramatic deepening of bilateral ties**. With the diplomatic endgame in Afghanistan coming into sight and US-Pakistan relations improving, the coming months will undoubtedly witness new broadsides in the "Obama disses India" narrative. There is good reason to criticize Washington's administration's languid engagement with India, though New Delhi's own level of enthusiasm deserves scrutiny as well. **Creating new momentum in relations will have to be a two-way street**.

#### -- Alt causes --- Iran and Afghanistan

**Karl 10** (David J., President – Asia Strategy Initiative, “[US-India Relations: Problems Posed by Afghanistan and Iran](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/31/us-india-relations-problems-posed-by-afghanistan-and-iran/)”, East Asia Forum, 8-31, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/31/us-india-relations-problems-posed-by-afghanistan-and-iran/)

After much criticism for appearing to neglect New Delhi while courting Beijing, the **Obama** administration **is** now **moving to inject** a sense of **urgency and momentum into US-India relations**. **But just as bilateral affairs seem to have acquired** new **dynamism, differences over Afghanistan and Iran threaten to undermine positive developments**. There are several factors that explain India’s drop from Washington’s foreign policy priorities. The Obama administration took office viewing Asia’s evolutions differently to the Bush era. And Obama’s prioritising of high profile engagement with Beijing on an array of global governance issues has diverted strategic focus from New Delhi. In an address on US policy in Asia in November 2009, Obama failed to mention India even in passing. The omission was all the more glaring as Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was due in Washington for a state visit a little over a week later. But China’s treatment of Obama during his state visit to Beijing in November 2009 and at the climate summit in Copenhagen a month later has seen the administration revert to Bush-era strategic balancing vis-à-vis China. The Bush administration’s publicly denied but widely understood goal was to build India’s strategic potential as a check against the rise of Chinese power. Is this also the goal of the Obama administration? Undersecretary of state for political affairs, William J. Burns, has affirmed in a recent address that the Obama administration is ‘deeply committed to supporting India’s rise.’ Burns has also called for India’s greater diplomatic and military involvement in East Asia and for enhanced US-Indian defence cooperation; ideas that are bound to irritate leaders in Beijing. A month later, Michele Flournoy, undersecretary of defence for policy, echoed these themes by proclaiming that ‘India’s success is very much in America’s national interest.’ This **heightened focus on India increases the likelihood that** President **Obama’s trip to India will establish new milestones in bilateral relations. But any attempt to strengthen this relationship will not be problem-free**. The **first** of these is **Afghanistan**. **Obama may need** to **shore up his** domestic **political base by accelerating the drawdown** of US military forces in Afghanistan.  **This would have obvious implications on Pakistan**, **and could** in turn **have serious consequences for** **US-India relations**. A **second** concern **is** the **tightening US sanctions against Iran**. With New Delhi feeling that the Obama administration has upset its interests in Afghanistan, India is enhancing its relations with Iran due to Indian dependence on Iranian oil resources. **The close India-Iran relationship has long troubled Washington**. For its part, the Indian government has complained that US sanctions that penalise companies helping the Iranian petroleum sector adversely affect Indian enterprises seeking to develop oil and natural gas fields in Iran. A few days after the sanctions were signed into law by President Obama, Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao explained that ties with Tehran are a ‘fundamental component’ of Indian foreign policy and noted there has been a ‘convergence of views’ on important issues. And referring to the new US sanctions, she stressed that sanctions can have direct and adverse impacts on Indian companies and India’s energy security. PJ Crowley, the US State Department spokesman, reacted to Rao’s address by stating that ‘business as usual’ with Iran by America’s friends and partners was no longer acceptable. **Afghanistan and Iran will test** the **nascent US-India strategic entente** just as President Obama arrives in New Delhi. What should be an opportunity to articulate the next chapter in the bilateral partnership could well spell out its limits.

#### -- No risk of collapse --- Obama will course correct to stabilize cooperation

**Raman 10 (**B., Former Cabinet Secretary – India, “Obama Attempts to Impart Momentum to Indo-US Ties”, Rediff, 6-4, http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/04/india-us-ties-back-on-fast-track.htm)

The **comments** of US leaders and officials in the run-up to the high-level strategic dialogue at the ministerial level currently under way in Washington, DC and the pre-announced decision of President Barack Obama [ [Images](http://search.rediff.com/imgsrch/default.php?MT=barack+obama) ] to attend the reception being hosted by US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton [ Images ], in honour of the Indian delegation on Wednesday, **indicated a realisation** by the  policy-makers of the Obama administration **of the importance attached to** the **Indo-US ties, which many believe have been downgraded** and the warmth towards India, which was characterised  the attitude of the Bush Administration towards India, has disappeared in less than a year after Obama took over as the President. The credit for drawing the attention of the Obama administration to the downslide in the comfort level between the two countries should go to analysts in India as well as the US----more particularly to the well-wishers of India in US non-governmental circles who kept sounding a wake-up call to the Obama administration that the gains of the second term of George Bush [ [Images](http://search.rediff.com/imgsrch/default.php?MT=george+bush) ] when Indo-US relations really started moving forward quantitatively and qualitatively, were being diluted by a  perceived lack of adequate attention to India. This perceived lack of adequate attention to India could be attributed to Obama's search for a workable exit policy from Afghanistan before the next presidential elections for which Pakistan's co-operation is considered necessary and for a workable economic recovery policy and a nuclear non-proliferation policy towards North Korea and Iran for which the co-operation of China was deemed necessary. The Obama administration also had to take note of Pakistani concerns over the growing Indian presence in Afghanistan and of Chinese concerns that the growing Indo-US ties under Bush were motivated by a common desire to balance China's rising stature. The first few months of the Obama administration were devoted to addressing Pakistan and China concerns without realising that this could have a negative impact on the relations with India. The open articulation by officials of the Obama administration and  some non-governmental experts of Pakistan's concerns over India's role in Afghanistan and the impression that they wittingly or unwittingly conveyed to India that they found these concerns understandable and the stepped-up military assistance to Pakistan, which was unrelated to its performance in action against terrorists operating from Pakistani territory, created an impression in India of a re-hyphenation of the US policies towards India and Pakistan, which had been discarded by the Bush Administration. Obama's unannounced jettisoning of various strategic initiatives undertaken by the Bush administration to balance China through enhancing India's power and status in the Asian region, joint naval exercises in areas of interest to China and by associating Japan [ Images ] with some of these initiatives and his action during his visit to China in November 2009 in reviving the policy of the Clinton administration of encouraging an activist role for China in South Asia--particularly in Indo-Pakistan matters--created an impression in India that a convergence of China-related perceptions, which was a defining characteristic of the policies of the Bush administration towards India was no longer a motivating factor in the White House. These two impressions--which were valid---tended to weaken the foundations of the Indo-US strategic architecture built up under Bush. **The welcome indication of  a greater focus on India in recent weeks and the beginnings of a course correction in policy-making towards India underline a realization by Obama of the intrinsic importance of  a** sound and **healthy strategic partnership between India and the US**. This does not presage a possible downgrading of the importance attached to Pakistan and China. While the Obama administration is convinced of the need to impart quality and momentum to Indo-US relations, **this exercise will be based** not **on** perceptions of common threats facing the two countries, but **common ideals such as** promotion of **democracy and** **common interests such as counter-terrorism, climate, knowledge and agriculture related initiatives**. The **Obama** administration **will take care to ensure that its course corrections give a feeling of satisfaction to India** without adding to the concerns of Pakistan and China. **Common bilateral ideals and interests will be the motivating factors**. Moderating Pakistan and balancing China will not be the motivating factors.

#### -- Empirically denied --- multiple previous setbacks

**Kurlantzick 10** (Joshua, Fellow for South-East Asia – Council on Foreign Relations, “Obama and Asia, Part Deux”, Asia Unbound – Blog of the Asia Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-8, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/categor y/india/u-s-india-relationship/)

**It’s been a rough seventeen months for the** **U**nited **S**tates **and India**. I’ve written about some of the challenges [here](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65995/evan-a-feigenbaum/indias-rise-americas-interest) and here—and talked about them [here](http://ibnlive.in.com/videos/113224/04_2010/ftn_1204_part/obama-cant-deliver-on-indias-concerns.html) and here. **First, there were** some **early missteps**, not least during the President’s 2008 campaign. As a candidate, Barack **Obama** told TIME’s Joe Klein that [he w**ould appoint a** U.S. **envoy to** seek peace in **Kashmir**](http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2008/10/23/the_full_obama_interview/). As president, he quickly backed off after strenuous Indian objections. **But Indian mistrust spiked**, then lingered, after his inauguration. **Second, the two sides** hit something of an intellectual wall. They’ve **lacked a new “big idea” to succeed the** U.S.-India civil **nuclear initiative**. We sometimes forget just how big that idea really was. It began, in a sense, as an effort to overcome a bilateral dispute left over from the 1970s. But it quickly became a full-fledged campaign to achieve a unique international status for India. **Third, the two sides suffered from a lack of momentum**. A crisis of vision (as I argued here) need not automatically have led to drift in the relationship. For instance, a package of smaller ideas could have pushed things forward. But many of **the best ideas and initiatives bogged down**. These included a bilateral investment treaty, expanded civil space cooperation, export control adjustments, defense procurement deals, a more ambitious bilateral agriculture initiative, and agreements on defense logistics and communications. Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation broadened, gathering momentum from an initial boost after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. But this really didn’t provide sufficient ballast.

### 2AC Wont Pass

#### It won’t pass and Obamacare is taking away focus and energy

Berman 10-29-13 Russell Berman, The HILL “ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration” [http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/188417-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration][MG]

The troubled rollout of the healthcare law has thrown a wrench into President Obama’s push for immigration reform. The White House and reform advocates in both parties have sought to refocus attention back to immigration following the 16-day government shutdown, but the problems plaguing the new federal insurance exchange website have dominated headlines. The White House is getting a boost from a coalition of 600 faith, law enforcement and business leaders that plan to descend Tuesday on Capitol Hill to urge the House to take up immigration legislation before the end of the year. “We’ve got to get Congress and the American public to focus on immigration because we’ve got such a short time to get it on the floor,” said Rep. Jeff Denham (Calif.), who over the weekend became the first Republican to sign on to a comprehensive immigration bill similar to the measure that passed the Senate in June. Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration. “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit. “There still is time on the House’s schedule to take up some immigration bills,” he said. Yet the administration’s attention — and message — is clearly divided. The White House has been inundated with questions about the buggy HealthCare.gov, the House has begun investigations, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has launched a daily press briefing to update the public on efforts to fix the website. The setback is a familiar one for immigration reform advocates, who have seen the issue be upended by three separate crises in recent months: the debate over military intervention in Syria, the government shutdown and now the implementation of the healthcare law. “It is getting overshadowed,” said Julian Zelizer, a political scientist at Princeton University. “It’s taking up time, and it is consuming the president’s attention,” he said of the healthcare rollout. Obama will travel to Massachusetts on Wednesday to deliver a speech on healthcare. Advocates in and outside of Congress are urging the House to act in some way on immigration before the end of the year, even if it is only on piecemeal legislation that would have to be reconciled with the Senate bill. They have long feared that once the calendar turns to 2014, jump-starting immigration reform will be next to impossible as attention shifts to the midterm election campaigns. “There’s a window here to move some bills before they go out, helping to set the stage for completing the process early next year and getting it done next year,” Johnson told reporters. “I don’t think that it’s the end of the world if they can’t get it all done by early February, but sure, once you start getting into April or May, you start running out of time.” Denham said the imperative was to “get something off the House floor so we can get to conference before the end of the year.” Boehner has ruled out taking up the Senate bill or any comprehensive measure. He has said he is “hopeful” the House can act on immigration, but for months, he has resisted taking a heavy hand in directing a path forward for a conference that remains dominated by conservatives.

#### Boehner Wont Introduce a Bill in the House

By Russell Berman - 10/29/13 06:00 AM ET ObamaCare steals spotlight from push on immigration reformhttp://thehill.com/homenews/administration/331063-obamacare-steals-spotlight-from-push-on-immigration#ixzz2jIkSw3ML

Denham said he hopes other Republicans will announce their support in the coming days, which could give fresh momentum to the legislative push that is central to Obama’s second-term agenda.¶ Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has yet to bring an immigration bill to the floor, and there is no indication he would do so in the five legislative weeks that remain on the House schedule in 2013. A bipartisan immigration group in the House collapsed in September when two Republicans left, citing a lack of trust in the Obama administration.¶ “We lost some time because of the shutdown,” said Randy Johnson, senior vice president at the Chamber of Commerce, which is participating in Tuesday’s “fly-in” lobbying visit.

### 2ac – pc

#### Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key – winners win

Michael Hirsch 12, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### Obama can’t influence Congress

Koffler 10/11

Keith Koffler, who covered the White House as a reporter for CongressDaily and Roll Call

Obama’s crisis of credibility

By: Keith Koffler

October 11, 2013

http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=CFCD7934-C4A3-4CCC-8261-9038B7E1D759

President Barack Obama is like a novice flier thrust into the cockpit of a 747. He’s pushing buttons, flipping switches and radioing air traffic control, but nothing’s happening. The plane is just slowly descending on its own, and while it may or may not crash, it at least doesn’t appear to be headed to any particularly useful destination.¶ Obama’s ineffectiveness, always a hallmark of his presidency, has reached a new cruising altitude this year. Not even a year into his second term, he looks like a lame duck and quacks like a lame duck. You guessed it — he’s a lame duck.¶ On the world stage, despite Obama’s exertions, Iran’s centrifuges are still spinning, the Israelis and Palestinians remain far apart, Bashar Assad is still in power, the Taliban are gaining strength and Iraq is gripped by renewed violence.¶ At home, none of Obama’s agenda has passed this year. Republicans aren’t bowing to him in the battle of the budget, and much of the GOP seems uninterested in House Speaker John Boehner’s vision of some new grand bargain with the president.Obama has something worse on his hands than being hated. All presidents get hated. But Obama is being ignored. And that’s because he has no credibility. A president enters office having earned a certain stock of political capital just for getting elected. He then spends it down, moving his agenda forward, until he collects a fresh supply by getting reelected. But political capital is only the intangible substrate that gives a president his might. His presidency must also be nourished by credibility — a sense he can be trusted, relied upon and feared — to make things happen. A president enters office with a measure of credibility. After all, he seemed at least trustworthy enough to get elected. But unlike political capital, credibility must be built in office. Otherwise, it is squandered. Obama has used every credibility-busting method available to eviscerate any sense that he can be counted on. He’s dissimulated, proven his unreliability, ruled arbitrarily and turned the White House into a Chicago-style political boiler room. His credibility has been sapped with his political opponents, a public that thinks him incompetent, our allies, who don’t trust him, and, even worse, our enemies, who don’t fear him.

### 2ac – black budget

#### The money for the plan would be taken covertly

Michael E. Salla, PhD Center for Global Peace/School of International Service American University, Washington DC 11/23/2003[ The black budget report, http://www.slideshare.net/ProphecyFactory/the-blackbudgetreport-9017285]

Birth of the Black Budget In 1947, the National Security Act created the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIA) and consolidated the US military into one entity, the Department of Defense (DoD). One of the issues that remained unresolved from the creation and operation of the CIA was the extent to which its budget and intelligence activities would remain a secret. According to Article 1, sec. 9, of the US Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.” This constitutional requirement conflicted with the need for secrecy concerning Congressional appropriations for the CIA. The solution was for Congress to pass legislation approving the secrecy over the funding mechanisms used for the CIA and its intelligence related activities. The necessary bill was passed with great haste and minimal debate causing considerable concern among those few Congressmen brave enough to openly challenge the constitutionality of the Act. [3] Congressman Emmanuel Celler of New York voted for the bill but protested: “If the members of the Armed Services Committee can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot the entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the untouchables? Secrecy is the answer.” [4] Celler, like the majority of Congressmen, passed the CIA Act very much like the wealthy father viewed the birth of an illegitimate child, appropriate care would be taken to provide for the child, but there would be no official admission of patrimony and the responsibility that entails. The 1949 CIA Act comprised additions to those sections of the 1947 National Security Act that dealt with the creation of CIA. The 1949 CIA Act gave a Congressional stamp of approval to the creation of a ‘black budget’ as the following sections make clear: … any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations [emphasis added]. Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of sections 403a to 403s of this title without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred. [5] This section meant that funds could be transferred from the appropriations of other government departments earmarked for specific tasks, “without regard to any provisions of law”. For example, a Congressional appropriation earmarked for housing subsidies to low-income workers by Housing and Urban Development (HUD), could be legally transferred either to the CIA for covert intelligence activities or through the CIA to a DoD associated intelligence agency for a classified program. Thus HUD employees might find that their relevant housing programs were lacking the necessary funds for relief efforts even though Congress had appropriated these funds for this purpose. Any HUD official unfortunate enough as to enquire into the location of the missing funds would be deterred from pursuing the issue, and if these officials persisted, they could be summarily dismissed, and then exposed to a variety of CIA activities to silence them. [6] Despite its legal authority to transfer funds from other federal agencies regardless of what their Congressional appropriations were for, the conventional wisdom was that the major source of appropriations for the CIA came through the DoD. This is apparently what President Truman had in mind when he approved that the "operating funds for the organization [CIA] would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead of directly from Congress." [7] This funding arrangement ostensibly assured that the CIA would be subordinate to the Secretaries of Defense and State who would be in a better position to influence its covert activities. Four years after passage of the 1949 CIA Act, the following categories and sums in the relevant defense force appropriations apparently provided the bulk of the black budget funding of the CIA.

### 2ac – defense spending popular

#### Defense spending is popular among Republicans

Kredo 3/21/13 – award-winning political reporter for the Washington Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others (Adam, “GOP united on keeping defense spending intact”, Free Beacon, http://freebeacon.com/defending-defense/)

Republican leaders are dismissing charges that the party is fractured on national security issues following the overwhelming passage of a House GOP budget measure that fully restored recently slashed defense spending. The House on Thursday approved by a vote of 228-191 a wide-ranging budget plan authored by Rep. Paul Ryan (R., Wis.). All but 10 Republicans voted in favor of the budget, while every Democrat voted against it. The Ryan plan would allocate about $560.2 billion in defense spending in 2014. That appropriation would all but negate the effects of the recent sequester, which eradicated millions in defense spending and threw the Pentagon into chaos. The allocation would prevent the Pentagon and United States military from being forced to implement a devastating series of cuts that would imperil not only troop readiness but also their benefits. A similar budget proposal authored by the House’s deficit-conscious Republican Study Committee (RSC) also included this level of defense spending, leading Republican leaders to dismiss charges that the party is fundamentally split on such issues. “The overwhelming conservative support for the Ryan budget and the RSC budget are the best indicators of where the Republican Party is on national security that I have seen in a while,” House Armed Services Committee chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.) told the Free Beacon following the vote. “After the saga of sequestration, we have come together as a party to declare that our military has been cut too much,” McKeon said. “By passing the House budget, we are making a restoration of vital national security resources a top policy priority, every bit as important as balancing the budget.”

### General – XO Solves

#### XO solves

Nakamura 1-6 – David Nakamura and Tara Bahrampour, January 6th, 2013 "Obama using authority for immigrant issues," Washington Post, www.journalgazette.net/article/20130106/NEWS03/301069950/1066/NEWS03

WASHINGTON - The Obama administration’s decision this week to ease visa requirements for hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants represents its latest move to reshape immigration through executive action, even as the White House gears up for an uncertain political fight over a far-more-sweeping legislative package in the months ahead.¶ Immigration advocates on Thursday hailed a rule change at the Department of Homeland Security that would make it easier for many undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States as they seek permanent residency, saying it will improve the lives of relatives who could have been separated for years without the changes.¶ For President Obama – who has called the inability to achieve comprehensive immigration reform among the biggest regrets of his first term – the new policy is among a series of steps his administration has taken over the past year aimed in part at easing the pace of deportations, which have surged during his tenure. The steps also came amid a presidential campaign that included sharp disagreements over immigration policy and strong support among Latinos and Asians for Obama.¶ The centerpiece was Obama’s decision, announced last June, to stop deporting people who were brought to the country as children and have gone on to be productive and otherwise law-abiding residents.¶ “He is checking off every administrative box he can of what he can do with executive authority that comports with his overall view of immigration policy,” said Angela Kelley, an analyst at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank allied with the White House.¶ The latest policy change is focused on illegal immigrants who have a spouse, parent or child with U.S. citizenship. Currently, in order to become legal they must leave the United States and apply for a waiver forgiving their unlawful presence in the country. Only then can they apply for an immigrant visa. And if they don’t get a waiver, they are barred from returning to the United States for up to 10 years, depending on the case.¶ The specter of being barred deterred many from applying. But under the rule change finalized Wednesday, those who qualify will be able to apply for waivers from within the United States starting March 4. Applicants must return to their native country for a brief period for the consular immigrant visa process.¶ The new rule greatly reduces the risk inherent in applying for a waiver, as people whose applications are rejected would still be in the United States when they heard the news. Even for those whose applications are approved, the new rule will allow them to spend much less time outside the United States, as they will travel abroad with waivers in hand.

### General – CIR Fails

#### Immigration cant solve the flood of applications

Murthy 9 (Law Firm, “What if CIR Passes? Can USCIS Handle the Increased Workload?”, NewsBrief, 10-30, http://www.murthy.com/news/n\_cirwkl.html)

Any type of legalization program will face significant opposition, particularly during an economic downturn. However, given the numbers of individuals possibly eligible, even under a less expansive program, the USCIS must prepare for a potential onslaught of applications if any type of CIR passes and becomes the law. As many MurthyDotCom and MurthyBulletin readers know from personal experience, the USCIS has historically suffered from backlogs and capacity issues. Were such a measure to pass, absent substantial changes, a flood of new applications could pose a significant challenge to the processing capacity of the USCIS. *USCIS Preparing to Expand Rapidly, Should Need Arise* A Reuters blog quoted USCIS spokesman, Bill Wright, as saying, “The agency has been preparing for the advent of any kind of a comprehensive immigration reform, and if that means a surge of applications and operations, we have been working toward that.” USCIS Director, Alejandro Mayorkas, has stated that the goal of the USCIS is to be ready to expand rapidly to handle the increase in applications that would result from CIR. In the past, opponents have used lack of capacity and preparation as an argument against CIR and expansion of eligibility for immigration benefits. *Will CIR Result in Increased or Reduced Backlogs for Others?* Legal immigrants and their employers have concerns about being disadvantaged by any CIR legislation that would provide benefits to undocumented workers. However, true CIR is not limited to these provisions, and would be expected to contain provisions regarding various aspects of legal immigration. CIR certainly will be hotly debated and any proposed legislation will be modified throughout the debate process. As part of the preparations of the USCIS, and in order not to harm those who have already initiated cases under existing law, the USCIS needs to continue to work on backlogs. While significant progress has been made in many areas, and case processing times have been improved greatly, there are still case backlogs that need to be addressed.

#### Private contractors hired to implement the plan causes fraud

West 7 (Bill, Chief of the National Security Section – Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration “Reform” Will Be National Security Disaster”, 5-17, [http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/ 05/immigration\_reform\_will\_be\_nat.php](http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/%2005/immigration_reform_will_be_nat.php))

CIS has indicated it would need to bring in private contractor personnel to help deal with the monumental workload increase from reform legislation. Such contractors will invariably be quickly hired, poorly trained, probably low-bid, barely vetted and far more subject to bribery and corruption than permanent Government employees. Not that bribery and corruption will necessarily be that necessary. In short order, the system will be overwhelmed. Whatever minimal fraud detection and prevention safeguards might be erected won’t last long in the face of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of applications and petitions to be adjudicated. What that means is the information provided on those applications and petitions, and whatever supporting documents they may have (if any), will essentially be taken at face value. Whatever the applicant alien tells the adjudicator will essentially be taken at face value. There will be little time or process available to verify anything, perhaps beyond running the applicant’s name through a standard battery of computer databases (and, even that may become so time consuming some will slip through the cracks).

#### Won’t net increase immigration

Benson 2 (Lenni B., Professor of Law – New York Law School, “Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law Reform”, Administrative Law Review, Winter, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, Lexis)

Many of the process failures arise from the failure of Congress and the agencies to adequately contend with the internal and external forces that shape the agency culture. n313 Although many of these factors operate in other areas of administrative law, several are particularly strong in immigration law. The failure to plan for and counteract these forces, has directly contributed to the erosion of the essential process values. n313 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 91 (1989) ("Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationship within an organization."). Wilson goes on to note that many organizations have multiple cultures and the relationship of the agency culture(s) to the agency mission may dramatically impact the effectiveness of the organization. See id. at 91-92. Here I am using culture in a broad manner to encompass both the internal and external forces that shape the organizations. a. Congressional Mandates and Dictated Priorities Congress must bear a large part of the responsibility for the crisis in immigration adjudications. n314 Congress mandated express and implied priorities in the statutes n315 or demanded prioritization of specific programs with  [\*283]  the threat of reduced funding or of imposing new statutory mandates. n316 For example, some statutory limits force an allocation of resources to a particular visa category without adequate consideration of how the allocation might disadvantage or paralyze a separate function. Two of the most obvious examples are the naturalization and H-1B petitions. When Congress pressures INS to reform and expedite its naturalization backlogs, the Service Centers move personnel away from the adjustment of status processing and the processing of the employment-based immigrant petitions. n317 The limitation of the total number of H-1B visas, necessitated that the INS put auditing procedures in place to be sure they did not approve more H-1B visas than the statute allowed. n318 Employers worrying about the cap filed large numbers of petitions in the winter and early spring to avoid being shut out of the category altogether. n319 Moving adjudicators to meet the thirty-day deadline meant other visa petitions had to sit waiting for adjudication. n314 Politics presents a treacherous double-edged sword for the INS' efficient and appropriate facilitation of immigration. The highly political debate persists about how vigorously the INS should control illegal immigration. When the INS engages in activities such as surprise work-site inspection, criticism immediately flows from immigrant groups and its conduct is subject to congressional scrutiny and investigation. Yet, on the other hand, if lawmakers perceive the INS as remiss in their duties, they immediately capitalize on the agency's unpopularity by encouraging resentment against it as congressional elections approach. A similar situation plagues other agencies, such as the IRS. See GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, supra note 12; see also Laurent, supra note 12, 13-18 (outlining Government Performance Project in detail). n315 See INA � 214(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. � 1184(c)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (mandating thirty day processing for H-1B and L-1 petitions). n316 See Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcomm. of the Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 183-213 (2000) (transcribing detailed questioning of how appropriated money to INS will be spent). n317 See supra text accompanying notes 183-85 and 215-16 (discussing current backlog problems). n318 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting numerical limitations imposed by statute). n319 Interview with Frances Berger, Attorney at Law, Law Office of Frances Berger, New York, N.Y. (July 8, 2000). Although Congress did not intend the agency to suspend other operations, the management of the agency responded to congressional and community pressure. However, the failure to adjudicate one type of petition means that pressure will mount in other categories or unnecessary work will be created. For example, if the immigrant petition cannot be processed in time, the employee will need a renewal of non-immigrant status. The extension petition could have been eliminated altogether if the INS had been able to process the I-140 in a timely fashion. The failure to adjudicate the adjustment of status applications meant that fewer people became permanent residents and a push to rush through cases created a bulge in the workflow. The sudden increase in workload resulted in delayed processing. Delayed processing means the initial grants of work or travel authorization expire. To obtain extensions of these, the individual must make a formal request and the INS has more work for its adjudication officers. n320 n320 See INS Nonimmigrant Classes, 8 C.F.R. � 214.2 (2000) (detailing general requirements for admission, extension, and maintenance of status). One bulge can build into a tidal wave five years later. In 1986, Congress authorized a legalization program resulting in more than three million people  [\*284]  becoming permanent residents over a five-year period. n321 Because permanent residents cannot apply for naturalization until they have completed five years of resident status, n322 the INS began to experience an upswing in the number of naturalization applications. n323 If the INS allows backlogs to grow, and then, through special initiatives, completes the adjustment of status applications for record numbers of people, the bulge will reappear a few years later in naturalization applications and in relative petitions for the employees' family members who have not yet immigrated to the United States.